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RECONSIDERING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTORS:
TRADING “COMPLIANCE BY COMPUTER” FOR
RELATIONSHIP BUILDING
MICHELLE C. PAUTZ
University of Dayton

ABSTRACT
Demands for government accountability extend into all the aspects of
government service and the environmental realm is no different.
Environmental inspectors - the front-line workers in environmental
protection agencies – are among the many civil servants who face
demands for accountability. Unfortunately, although accountability is
desirable normatively speaking, in practice it is not so simple.
Accountability for environmental inspectors frequently involves
measures such as the number of inspections completed, the efficiency
of data entry in agency databases, and the turnaround time on
inspection reports. Such measures leave environmental inspectors, who
ideally want - and practically need - to be in the field, stuck in the
office ensuring “compliance by computer;” extensive interviews with
environmental inspectors in Virginia and Ohio substantiate these
assertions. Yet inspectors desire (along with their supervisors) positive
and cooperative relationships with the regulated community.
Overwhelming majorities of inspectors in Virginia and Ohio see good
relationships as necessary for the success of environmental regulation.
The sentiments of inspectors are echoed in much of the accountability
literature that questions the tendency to embrace various performance
measures over the importance of dialogue and an emphasis on
discretion. This paper argues that “compliance by computer” is
detrimental to the existing environmental regulatory system and
maintains that accountability should be sought by building positive
relationships between inspectors and the regulated community.
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Discussions of accountability have permeated the
field of public administration for some time and seem to
occupy our collective conscious when it comes to
evaluating the performance of civil servants and agencies
alike. Of particular importance in this conversation is the
role of street-level bureaucrats, or front-line workers.
Although these crucial civil servants are increasingly
considered – particularly with regards to accountability (c.f.
Hupe and Hill 2007; Pollitt 2003; Day and Klein 1987) –
key segments of the front-line worker population continue
to be neglected. Most specifically, front-line workers in the
environmental policy arena play a significant, yet routinely
overlooked, role in protecting and ensuring the quality of
the natural environment (there are a few exceptions,
however, c.f. Scheberle 2004; Pautz 2009). Environmental
inspectors are those civil servants who work predominantly
at the state level and interact with the regulated community
to ensure compliance with environmental laws. As with all
categories of civil servants, it is suspected that
environmental inspectors face competing definitions of
accountability that can adversely impact performance and
achievement of policy goals. Perhaps one of the most
important ways to gain insight about the types of
accountability these front-line regulators encounter is to ask
the regulators themselves.
Environmental inspectors in Virginia and Ohio were
interviewed to determine their perceptions on interacting
with the regulated community and how accountability is
manifested. The results of 34 interviews and subsequent
qualitative data analysis provide initial insights into the
types of accountability these inspectors would prefer and
demonstrate that “compliance by computer” occurs from a
seemingly overreliance on output rather than outcome
measures. Inspectors in this study would prefer to be in the
field interacting with the regulated community and building
relationships with them to achieve the best possible
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environmental outcomes. Instead, the inherent tensions of
pursuing conflicting views of accountability appear to leave
these inspectors stuck in the office processing paperwork
rather than working with their counterparts in the regulated
community to achieve environmental goals. Understanding
inspectors‟ views on accountability are particularly relevant
in the environmental policy arena as more alternative
policy tools are being embraced that embody fewer
attributes of traditional command and control policies.
To investigate the perceptions of inspectors and
their work, this exploratory research begins by
contextualizing the interviews with a brief look at
conceptualizations of accountability and their applicability
to the work of regulators. Then the discussion shifts to a
more focused consideration of environmental inspectors
themselves and why conversations with inspectors directly
are long overdue. With this background, the findings from
the nearly three dozen interviews are examined before the
paper concludes with a look at the implications of shifting
from bureaucratic to professional accountability for
environmental inspectors.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Before exploring the remarks of nearly three dozen
environmental inspectors, first we must examine
accountability in the context of these front-line regulators.
Accountability, despite its ubiquity in public administration
(c.f. Frederickson 2007), does not have a standard, widely
accepted definition (c.f. Koppell 2005). Romzek (2000)
defines accountability as the process of holding someone
answerable for performance. There is extensive discussion
regarding the dimensions and types of accountability (c.f.
Romzek & Dubnick 1987; Romzek 2000; Behn 2001;
Gormley & Balla 2004; Koppell 2005) and Frederickson
(2007), among others, notes the dominance of
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accountability discussions in public administration and how
much of those discussions focus on accountability as “little
more than measures of organizational performance” (11).
Without delving into the intricacies of the debate swirling
around accountability‟s definition, recall Romzek and
Dubnick‟s (1987) four types of accountability: legal,
bureaucratic, professional, and political. This typology is
devised based on the source of agency control (internal or
external) and the degree of control over agency actions
(high or low).
Accountability is particularly important in the work
of the civil service since government is instituted to serve
the public interest. Although academic discussions struggle
to define public interest, the public interest is both “a verbal
symbol [and] an institutional force” (Goodsell 1990, 107).
Goodsell (1990) argues that civil servants are the leading
embodiment and proponent of the public interest. Such
sentiments are echoed in discussions of the roles of public
administrators and to whom they are answerable (c.f.
Denhardt and Denhardt 2003; Behn 2001; Hamilton 2007).
More specifically, accountability concerns are
pronounced in the regulatory state because of fears of
regulatory capture by the regulated community and,
therefore, a disregard for the public interest. Capture
theory or economic regulatory theory, maintains that
regulatory action (or inaction) is dictated by individuals
pursuing their own interests (c.f. Stigler 1971; Peltzman
1976). The interests of regulatory actors are diverse and
their actions may be guided by a plethora of motives. For
instance, decision making may be dictated by monetary
considerations, job retention or future employment
aspirations (e.g. the “revolving door” effect), selfgratification, or the desire for tranquility between entities
(Gormley 1979; Levine & Forrence 1990; Laffont & Tirole
1991). In the case of environmental inspectors, the
longstanding sentiment is that inspectors have a great deal

PAQ FALL 2011

367

of discretion in their job duties leaving them susceptible to
undue influence that does not serve the public.
Accordingly, to mitigate capture fears, inspectors are held
accountable through various mechanisms. This mention of
capture theory is made because it helps to understand why
accountability concerns are so pronounced in the regulatory
arena despite a sizable and growing chorus of literature that
refutes capture theory of regulation and posits a more
positive view of civil servants and regulatory agencies (c.f.
Croley 2008; Joskow & Noll 1981; Viscusi, Vernon, &
Harrington 2005). Indeed, Pautz (2009) argues positive,
trusting relationships are vital between inspectors and the
regulated community for better environmental outcomes.
Despite the prominence of accountability in public
administration and governance discussions and longstanding concerns of regulatory capture of civil servants,
one might expect an extensive discussion of accountability
in the regulatory state. More specifically, since front-line
regulators play an integral role in the implementation and
monitoring of regulations and utilize discretion in those
responsibilities, discussions of accountability are
undoubtedly important. However, such a discussion is
largely absent. Scott (2000) notes that accountability is a
multilevel concept in the regulatory state and Lodge (2004)
expands this discussion to consider how to make
accountability improvements. Accordingly, it is of little
surprise that front-line workers, despite their significance in
the regulatory state, are generally ignored in these
discussions of regulation and accountability since this
population of actors is frequently omitted (c.f. Lipsky 1980;
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, among others).
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
INSPECTORS
Environmental inspectors experience daily the
demands of accountability in their work interacting with the
regulated community. In most environmental protection
agencies, inspectors specialize in a particular
environmental media (or area), such as air, water, or waste.
An individual inspector is responsible for an array of
facilities that hold a permit to operate and emit specified
levels of pollution. The actual number of facilities an
inspector is responsible for can range from 20 or 30 to
several hundred, depending on the type of facility and why
it is regulated (Pautz 2009). These facilities are generally
scattered over a given geographic area and the types of
operations can vary dramatically.
For example, an
inspector may be responsible for inspecting facilities that
range from a cigarette producing plant to a metal scrap yard
to a dry cleaner. Thus, the inspector must be conversant
with the operations and pollution abatement technologies
for a wide array of often unrelated facilities.
The central component of an inspector‟s job
responsibilities is the physical site inspection of a facility to
determine compliance with environmental regulations. “As
the word „inspector‟ suggests, routine inspections and
check visits are the „traditional‟ methods of operation for
many regulatory officials and ones which are regarded as
fundamental by field staff” (Hutter 1997, 107). In addition
to the physical site inspections, the inspector has a variety
of other duties, including extensive recordkeeping and
complaints investigation.
This discussion has explored the roles of
environmental inspectors under the traditional command
and control regulatory regime. Although this approach to
environmental protection continues to be the dominant
model, movement towards the “next-generation” of
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environmental policies appears to be underway in some
areas (c.f. Durant, Fiorino, and O‟Leary 2004; Eisner 2006;
Fiorino 2006). In comparison to command and control
regulations, next-generation policies are cooperative not
confrontational, comprehensive rather than fragmented, and
flexible instead of rigid (Chertow and Esty 1997, 4). These
policies require regulators and the regulated community to
work together to devise courses of action to achieve
prescribed outcomes.
Accordingly, next-generation
policies, which will be explored more extensively in a
subsequent section, are less prescriptive and require greater
flexibility – thus, they are dependent on inspectors
exercising greater discretion. As such, accountability
becomes even more of a concern.
This brief review of inspectors‟ primary duties
highlights the significant role they play in environmental
regulation. Accordingly, one might expect that they are
afforded considerable attention, but inspectors are typically
granted only passing acknowledgments. Bardach and
Kagan (1982/2002), for example, discuss environmental
inspectors as part of their larger examination of “regulatory
unreasonableness” in the United States. In the lone chapter
devoted to inspectors, they address the characteristics of
“good inspectors” by drawing parallels with the literature
on “good cops.” According to Bardach and Kagan, an
inspector should be adept at resolving disputes and other
problems while endeavoring to keep disagreements and
difficulties from turning into adversarial relationships;
inspectors should have sufficient knowledge and
understanding of technical issues.
Then again, perhaps it is not surprising that these
front-line workers are frequently overlooked. Hummel
(1991) and Schmidt (1993), among others, have discussed
the tendency to neglect the value that local knowledge
brings to discussions of policy formation and
implementation. Pautz and Schnitzer (2008) call attention
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to overlooked populations in environmental policymaking,
notably inspectors and publics, but do not connect their
roles with accountability.
May (2007), however, is an exception when he
applies Romzek and Dubnick‟s (1987) typology of
accountability to regulatory regimes and the actions of
regulators. In particular, he focuses on two of the four
types of accountability directly related to the work of
regulators: bureaucratic and professional accountability.
Bureaucratic accountability refers to accountability
structures that foster supervisory control over a range of
agency actions (Romzek and Dubnick 228).
More
specifically, close supervision and detailed standard
operating procedures are essential to ensure that orders are
followed. May takes Romzek and Dubnick‟s description
one step further in its application to the work of regulators
and notes that regulators‟ discretion is curtailed through the
use of checklists and other bureaucratic controls that “limit
discretion of inspectors and guide their actions” (May 12).
Applied to front-line environmental regulators, bureaucratic
accountability is observable in the use of detailed checklists
for inspections, prescribed standard operating procedures
for conducting on-site sampling and inspections, as well as
set procedures for reviewing reports from regulated entities,
and enormous amounts of paperwork to ensure that a
satisfactory paper trail exists
for compliance
determinations. These accountability mechanisms coincide
well with the traditional, command and control approach to
environmental regulations.
Emphasis is placed on
standardization of methods and numerous reporting
requirements.
Professional accountability, by contrast, is
characterized by deference to professional expertise and
flexibility in decision making and actions because of the
complex nature of the issues (Romzek and Dubnick 229).
May (2007) picks up on the importance of regulators‟
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discretion, as governed by professional knowledge and
experience, in achieving desired regulatory outcomes.
Instead of focusing on specific and stringent procedures
and measures, regulators instead exercise professional
judgment to achieve desired results (May 12). For
environmental inspectors, professional accountability
would be manifested in a fundamentally different way than
bureaucratic accountability since the former recognizes the
professional expertise of the inspectors and therefore
affords inspectors deference in their actions.
More
specifically, professional accountability may be observable
through less rigid checklists and procedures for inspectors
to follow in the field in exchange for general guidance and
more flexibility for the inspectors to work with the
regulated community to achieve environmental outcomes in
a cooperative manner while adhering to the dictates of
existing environmental regulations. Here inspectors would
be given more flexibility in pursuing outcomes with less
rigidity in the process. Professional accountability tends to
coincide with next generation environmental policies that
tend to provide more general guidance and less specific
provisions to achieve environmental outcomes (a more
thorough discussion of next generation policies follows in a
subsequent section).1
While bureaucratic accountability seems to be the
norm in the regulatory state in keeping with command and
control approaches, professional accountability appears to
be the desired form of accountability among regulatory
theorists (May 2007). Sparrow (2000) and Bardach and
Kagan (1982/2002) argue that professional accountability is
the best method of achieving desired regulatory outcomes
and protecting against regulatory abuse and capture.
Regulators should be able to adapt a “pragmatic approach”
1

Although this is not to say that professional accountability could not find a
place under the traditional, command and control regulatory structure of
existing environmental regulations. An example of this application follows.
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to dealing with the regulated community since a „one-size
fits all‟ approach is not feasible (Sparrow 2000; May 2007).
Regulators need the flexibility to deal with firms as the
situation warrants, as guided by their professional expertise
and judgment to achieve desired outcomes for the public,
and rigid procedures and policies stymie such efforts. The
results of stringent controls on regulators are often less
desirable policy outcomes.
Consider the following example that demonstrates
different types of accountability and illustrates the potential
importance of professional accountability. A solid waste
inspector is visiting one of the landfills she is responsible
for overseeing after a significant period of rain in the
region. After a turbulent compliance history since the
landfill began operation, this inspector was newly assigned
to the site and became determined to bring this landfill into
compliance and keep it in compliance. She and the staff at
the landfill worked together for the first year or so going
through many issues and gaining the trust of one another.
In the process, the landfill was more and more forthcoming
about some of the challenges it was facing in compliance
and she was able to help them devise solutions to solve
myriad problems. For the last few years, this particular
landfill has been in compliance, even with the pesky
paperwork requirements that baffle most. A major issue
with landfills is erosion for understandable reasons. Upon
arrival at the landfill, the inspector noticed some significant
areas of erosion that would indicate the facility is out of
compliance. Instead of automatically citing the landfill for
its erosion problems – unquestionably due to the
unseasonable and significant rains the region just
experienced – the inspector, exercising professional
judgment, points out the problems to the landfill operators
(which they are already well aware) and tells them to take
corrective measures and she will be back in a week to
follow up. Here, the dictates of bureaucratic accountability
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and its rigid procedures would dictate a citation; however,
professional accountability allowed the inspector to
recognize that the landfill is abiding by the rules but is
coping with weather patterns beyond its control and is
temporarily out of compliance.
Instead of being
unreasonable, the inspector, with her years of experience
with the landfill, decided the best course of action was to
utilize her discretion and allow the facility to come into
compliance on its own instead of jumping to an adversarial
posture that would have unknown and incalculable
repercussions.2
Although one type of accountability appears to be
favored among regulatory scholars (c.f. Sparrow 2000;
Bardach and Kagan 1982/2002; May 2007), one could
reasonably surmise that multiple views on accountability
exist in regulatory agencies.
Yet, these multiple
perspectives on accountability can make public agencies
and their civil servants “mad” as the different approaches
are often in tension with one another (Koppell 2005).
These competing types of accountability can often lead to
poor performance since different forms of accountability
may be in conflict with one another (Romzek and Dubnick
1987; Behn 2001; Koppell 2005).3
The preceding
discussion gives rise to a number of questions, including:
what are the types of accountability being pursued in the
environmental regulatory system; and, perhaps more
importantly, what type of accountability should be
pursued?
There are no easy answers to the aforementioned
questions. Perhaps as a starting point since accountability
2

This example demonstrates that professional accountability could find a place
in the traditional environmental regulatory structure, not just with next
generation environmental policies.
3
Furthermore, as Dubnick (2005) reminds us, the assumption is routinely made
that there is a positive relationship between accountability and performance, yet
that assumption is frequently untested and may indeed be false.
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is being demanded of inspectors, both because of the
general trend toward increasing accountability in a
democratic society and because of persistent fears of
regulatory capture, we should consider inspectors‟ own
views of their jobs and their work with the regulated
community. More specifically, much of the concern
regarding accountability stems from the interactions
inspectors have with the regulated community; therefore,
we should focus our investigation on these interactions. As
previously discussed, it is important not to overlook the
experiences of those on the ground level, even though the
propensity is to focus elsewhere (c.f. Hummel 1991;
Schmidt 1993).
Furthermore, Hedge, Menzel, and
Williams (1988) note that regulators‟ perceptions impact
how they do their jobs. In particular, by investigating
inspectors‟ desires and challenges in regulatory
interactions, we can better assess the accountability
mechanisms they face in their day-to-day responsibilities.
These insights may enable us to determine whether
bureaucratic accountability or professional accountability is
emphasized. If we can discern which accountability
mechanisms seem to be stressed, we can then begin an
important discussion about what might be most appropriate
in the environmental regulatory state and what changes
should come in the future.
INSPECTORS AND THEIR VIEWS
Before outlining the parameters of this exploratory
study, it is worth noting the significance of states in
environmental policy and why state regulators were
selected instead of federal regulators. Lowry (1992)
succinctly states: “[s]tates matter. Policies are not simply
created by national officials and then routinely
implemented by state and local governments as if they were
unquestioning automatons in some Weberian machine” (3-
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4). Since states have been granted more and more authority
for meeting federal environmental standards, their
responsibilities have grown.
“Consequently, the
operational responsibility for most of EPA‟s major
programs currently lies with the states, and EPA routinely
relies on states to implement the full range of
environmental responsibilities associated with these
programs, such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act" (GAO 2002, 4). These broad authorizations have
given the states “considerable latitude” in environmental
regulation (Sigman 2003, 108).
Several indicators depict the scope of state
involvement in environmental regulation.
The
Environmental Council of States (ECOS) reports, for
example, that the states regulated over 1.75 million sites in
1999, inspected those sites more than 500,000 times and
made over 449,000 additional compliance evaluations in
the same year (ECOS 2001).4 According to Rabe (2006),
the states
collectively issue more than 90 percent of all
environmental permits, complete more than 75
percent of all environmental enforcement actions,
and rely on the federal government for less than
25 percent of their total funding on environmental
and natural resource concerns (35-36).
Thus, “[i]t is no exaggeration to conclude that policy
depends on the capacity and willingness of individual states
to implement federal policy” (Eisner 2006, 36).
In keeping with the significance of states in
environmental protection, two states, Virginia and Ohio,
were selected to begin exploring the perceptions and
4

Unfortunately, more recent data are not available from the ECOS on
the numbers of regulated facilities and inspections conducted by the
states.
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approaches of front-line regulators in environmental
protection. Both states were selected chiefly for ease of
access since face-to-face interviews were sought as the
primary means of data collection. Virginia and Ohio are
among the middle range and majority of states in its
commitment to and capacity for environmental protection
(O‟Leary and Yandle, 2000; Rabe 2006; Wingfield and
Marcus 2007).5 Therefore, both states should allow for
insights into an average state environmental protection
agency.
Interviews with 34 state level environmental
inspectors were conducted in Ohio and Virginia. The semistructured, one-on-one interviews were conducted in person
with two exceptions.6 Twenty-two inspectors from the
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality7 (DEQ) and
12 inspectors from the Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency8 (OEPA) were interviewed.
Voluntary
participation from inspectors in both agencies was sought,
although the procedures vary slightly based on access

5

O‟Leary and Yandle (2000) report the Lester Environmental Protection
Grades for 50 states which are compiled based on a state‟s commitment to
environmental quality and its institutional capacity for environmental
management. Both Virginia and Ohio received a “C” rating and the majority of
states (30) fell in the range of either a “B” or “C.” These grades were based on
states‟ commitment to environmental quality and their institutional capacity for
environmental management.
6
All but two of the 34 interviews were conducted in person; two interviews
with DEQ inspectors were conducted via phone at the request of the inspectors
for logistical reasons. Moreover, the interviews were not recorded because
pilot interviews revealed a nervousness of inspectors to be candid in their
responses. This proved to be the correct decision for these interviews because a
number of interviewees remarked “since you‟re not recording this, I‟ll tell you
about…”, for example.
7
The 22 DEQ inspectors represent all seven regions of Virginia (Northern
Virginia, Piedmont, South Central, Southwest, Tidewater, West Central, and
Valley). The interviews were conducted in Summer 2007.
8
The 12 OEPA inspectors were from the southwest regional office. The
interviews were conducted Summer 2009.
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directives given.9 The 22 inspectors interviewed from
DEQ represent approximately 13 percent of the inspectors
in DEQ.10 The inspectors from OEPA are all based in the
Southwest District Office located in Dayton and they
represent approximately 10 percent of the entire district
staff.11 Accordingly, although 34 inspectors constitute a
sizable group to conduct one-on-one interviews with, these
inspectors represent a small percentage of both states‟
inspector populations. As such, it is important to recognize
the limits of generalizablility that are possible from this
study‟s findings.12
Despite these limitations, this
exploratory research is important in calling attention to the
accountability challenges environmental regulators may
face, and more generally, attention to front-line actors in
environmental policy.
The 34 inspectors comprise a relatively diverse
group of individuals.
As might be expected with
9

To gain access to DEQ, the regional supervisor for each media in all seven
regions was contacted and based upon the responses of each of the 21
supervisors, I sought interviews with inspectors across regions and
environmental media. Some supervisors sent me the names and contact
information for inspectors I could speak with while other supervisors said I
could contact whomever and still other supervisors ignored repeated inquiries.
Naturally selection bias becomes a concern since I was not able to draw a
random sample of inspectors, but given the necessity of gaining agency
permission and access, I had to seek interviews in accordance with agency
directions.
10
The figure of 13 percent is based on the total number of inspectors budgeted
for in the agency, not the current number of filled inspector positions.
11
To gain access to the OEPA, several meetings were held with the leadership
of the regional office and it was decided that I would directly approach the
region‟s staff at one of their regularly scheduled staff meetings. At the
meeting, I made brief remarks about the nature of the research and what type of
involvement I was seeking from the front-line regulators. Afterwards, I invited
regulators to sign-up to be contacted for an interview and interviews were
secured with all OEPA staff that expressed an interest in being interviewed.
12
Nonresponse bias of course is a concern, however, neither agency was able
to provide me background data on their regulators as a whole so that
comparisons between the interview sample and the larger population could be
made. The inability to explore the nonresponse bias is not ideal, however, this
research is exploratory and makes limited generalizability claims.
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environmental professionals, 76 percent of the inspectors
interviewed were male.13 The average inspector has been
in his/her job for more than 10 years. All three major
environmental media (air, water, and waste) were
represented in the sample: 13 air inspectors14, 13 water
inspectors, and eight waste inspectors were interviewed.
Essential Elements of Interactions
Accountability concerns stem from inspectors‟
routine interactions with members of the regulated
community. These interviews probe inspectors for what
they want in these interactions so we can gain insights into
what the front-line regulators desire in their regulatory
interactions; and, therefore, might allow us to deduce what
forms of accountability they prefer. Inspectors were asked
what makes for good interactions with members of the
regulated community and these essential elements are
found in Table 1.

13

It is not surprising to find a significant majority of regulators were male
considering the dominance of the environmental sciences fields by men for
quite some time.
14
No air inspectors from OEPA were interviewed because although there is a
division of air pollution in OEPA, most of the compliance and enforcement
oversight with air regulations in the SWDO is relegated to local entities that are
responsible for such measures, such as the Regional Air Pollution Control
Agency (RAPCA).
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Table 1
Essential Elements of Interactions with Regulated
Community (N=34)
Element15
Percentage (N)16
Cooperation/Positive Attitude to Work
Together
Communication and Responsiveness
Build rapport, relationships
Knowledgeable
Understand the other side, perspective
Explain purpose, help
Openness/Honesty
Respect

53 percent (18)
41 percent (14)
38 percent (13)
32 percent (11)
26 percent (9)
24 percent (8)
21 percent (7)
18 percent (6)

Although there are several striking observations
from these findings, the dominant theme inspectors report
they want in their interactions is a good working
relationship with the regulated community. Cooperation
and communication are the most common elements that
inspectors want in their interactions. One may infer that
relationships where both sides cooperate, communicate,
understand each other, and are open require a significant
degree of flexibility and discretion on the part of the
inspectors to foster. It is fascinating to note that inspectors
did not emphasize that good interactions with the regulated
community are characterized by the regulated community
using the “correct” pollution abatement technology. Rather
inspectors seem to indicate that the cooperative interactions
are most important.

15

Inspectors were asked what are the essential elements for positive
interactions with the regulated community; they were not asked for a
predetermined number, simply whatever came to mind.
16
The percentage indicates the percent of inspectors who offered each essential
element and the actual number of inspectors is in parentheses. Therefore, 53
percent or 18 inspectors said cooperation was an essential element. An
inspector may have offered cooperation, communication, and respect as
essential elements.
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These findings seem to align with the attributes of
professional
accountability
previously
discussed.
Inspectors want to exercise professional judgment to work
together with the regulated community and help them
achieve compliance with environmental regulations.
Inspectors frequently report that the best outcomes result
when the two sides work together to solve a problem.
Working together requires that inspectors have the
flexibility and discretion that comes with professional
judgment. Being forced to follow set procedures –
indicative of bureaucratic accountability – could limit
relationship building efforts.
The genesis for many of these essential elements
undoubtedly comes from the varied experiences of the
inspectors. These experiences are illustrated through
several stories.17 One air inspector at DEQ conveyed his
experiences with a printing facility. The inspector was at
the facility conducting a routine inspection and noted that
the rag buckets were uncovered – a permit violation. The
facility personnel accompanying the inspector on his
inspection were encouraged to remedy the problem so they
would not face a penalty. However, the facility official did
not take the opportunity to do so. This experience shows
inspectors desiring facility personnel to be cooperative and
be receptive to open communications. A water inspector
noted that showing an interest in a facility, beyond the
inspector‟s reasons for being there, goes a long way in
building a relationship with the facility personnel. This
inspector was visiting a poultry processing plant and
eagerly took the facility tour, complete with a trip to the
17

It is worth noting that when interviewees were asked to convey stories about
positive experiences with the regulated community, inspectors frequently
remarked that there were so many good stories, it was difficult to pick one or
two to talk about. Inspectors were asked to relay stories to help exemplify what
they thought were essential elements in their interactions with the regulated
community.
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“kill floor.” At the close of the visit, the inspector was
surprised to observe how pleased the facility official was
that the inspector took a genuine interest in the facility‟s
operation and the facility official had an opportunity to put
his company‟s work on display. Another air inspector was
working with a paper and cardboard manufacturer that
needed to switch to a fuel that contained a higher sulfur
content for production purposes. The facility official was
unsure what permit modifications might be needed, so the
official contacted the inspector so that they could work
together to figure out what steps the facility needed to take
to switch fuels. A similar story is conveyed by an OEPA
water inspector who was dealing with a facility that
exceeded its cooper limits. The facility official wanted to
cooperate with OEPA and was open enough to answer
questions and work with the inspector to figure out that the
extra cooper was coming from mop water being dumped
down the drain, not industrial processes. It could be argued
that these experiences demonstrate that positive
relationships lead to better environmental outcomes for the
public because compliance can be achieved more quickly
rather than every issue resorting to an acrimonious fight
over which side is correct.
Challenges and Obstacles in Interactions
It is equally important to consider what inspectors
find most challenging in their interactions with the
regulated community and what they would most like to see
changed. Understanding the challenges inspectors face
might provide insights into the procedures and other control
mechanisms that they find frustrating and these obstacles
may illuminate any undesirable aspects of accountability.
Each inspector was asked what are the biggest challenges
or obstacles in interacting with the regulated community
and the results are reported in Table 2.
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Table 2.
Challenges/Obstacles in Interactions with Regulated
Community (N=33)18
Challenge/Obstacle19
Percentage (N)20
Complexity of regulations
Burdensome paperwork and procedures
CEDS (internal DEQ database)
Negative perceptions of government
Inspector issues (e.g. low morale, entry
level position)
Need for more flexibility/discretion

45 percent (15)
33 percent (11)
21 percent (7)
21 percent (7)
21 percent (7)
18 percent (6)

These findings may not be surprising given that
they echo many common complaints of front-line workers
(c.f. Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003).
The most common challenge inspectors reported was trying
to contend with the complexity of the regulations.
Inspectors expressed frustration at the complexities of both
federal and state regulations that often render them
incomprehensible even to the inspectors tasked with
enforcing them. One air inspector noted that the confusion
the regulations cause frustrates not only the inspectors, but
the facility personnel too. Often frustration levels grow
over the regulations which can impede the interaction of
inspectors and facility personnel. Adding to these issues,
an OEPA waste inspector lamented that waste regulations
have to be revised every five years and the almost constant
revision leaves regulators and the regulated community
struggling to keep up with changes. He would rather see
18

There is missing data for one inspector interview.
Interviewees were asked: what are the biggest challenges you face in
interacting with the regulated community. The question was open-ended and
responses were organized after the interviews were completed. Interviewees
were not asked for a predetermined number of challenges.
20
Number of interviewees who stated a particular challenge, both raw number
and percentage of total interviewees. The percentages reflect the frequency;
therefore, they do not add to 100 percent.
19
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the regulations “reexamined” instead of “rewritten”
because, after all, “if it‟s not broke, don‟t fix [it].”
Complex statutes are a traditional way legislatures
endeavor to control bureaucracies and stem fears of
regulatory capture.
Moreover, confusing regulations
written by a regulatory agency are often a means to
demonstrate accountability to their oversight bodies.
Besides complaints about the regulations
themselves, most of the other reported challenges have to
deal with issues related to bureaucratic accountability.
Inspectors complain about paperwork that keeps them in
the office and tied to the computer checking off boxes in
databases; inspectors at DEQ frequently criticized the
agency‟s internal database (Comprehensive Environmental
Data System or CEDS) and lamented that it was one of the
most frustrating aspects of their jobs. An air inspector
reported that he became so frustrated with CEDS that he
developed his own tracking spreadsheet to keep up with his
facilities; his supervisor liked the inspector‟s own
spreadsheet so much more than CEDS that he asked the
inspector for a copy of the file so he could use it too. An
OEPA water inspector said his biggest aggravation is the
procedures he and the regulated community have to follow
that makes the system inflexible; he would prefer a “more
nimble” system to better accomplish environmental goals.
Another OEPA water inspector reported that that the
system is turning “into a paper program” where compliance
boils down to pushing paper instead of having a
“meaningful” environmental protection system.
Additionally, a handful of inspectors indicated that
they simply needed more flexibility and discretion to do
their jobs. This finding is intriguing as it lends support to
Sparrow (2000), Bardach and Kagan (1982/2002), and
others, who note that regulators need more flexibility and
discretion in their work to help produce the desired
regulatory outcomes.
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Perhaps these challenges are best summed up by an
air inspector in Virginia who reported that the way
environmental enforcement works is essentially
“compliance by computer.” In other words, databases
designed to ensure permit conditions are met have become
the de facto mechanisms for determining environmental
performance by simply checking off boxes, such as did the
facility turn in their report on time. The same inspector
said it is vital for inspectors to “get out as often” as possible
because that is where environmental compliance is truly
determined. This inspector, along with his colleagues,
routinely indicated that although checklists can be useful at
times, they do not ensure environmental protection. Being
in the field at a facility, observing the facility‟s operations,
and interacting with the individuals at the facility is the best
means of ensuring the health of the environment, according
to this inspector.
One may conclude that the challenges inspectors
report are more closely aligned with bureaucratic
accountability. Inspectors in this study are frustrated over
complexity of regulations that dictate how they are
supposed to do almost everything, paperwork and other
“bureaucratic” procedures, and even an agency database. It
is reasonable to surmise that these procedures are in place
to maintain bureaucratic accountability, yet these are the
sources of greatest frustration to inspectors in their work
interacting with the regulated community because it
constrains their actions of seeking desired environmental
outcomes for the public. This is not to say that inspectors
do not understand why these circumstances exist, but they
are frustrating nonetheless and inspectors would like them
to change.
Inspectors in this study do not report
frustrations with the freedom or discretion they have in
their interactions, by contrast.
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The 34 inspectors in this study express numerous
frustrations in interacting with the regulated community.
These complaints, including burdensome paperwork that
keeps them in the office, internal databases, and an outright
desire for more flexibility, lend support to existing research
that regulators face bureaucratic accountability controls
(c.f. May 2007). Yet these inspectors indicate that they
want positive working relationships with members of the
regulated community. More specifically, they strive to
build relationships with their counterparts, they want open
and honest communication, and they want to help them
achieve and maintain compliance. Positive relationships
are more efficient in ensuring environmental outcomes
compared to adversarial ones (Pautz 2009). Regardless of
the types of accountability mechanisms in place, however,
there must be some form of accountability for inspectors to
guard against regulatory capture and ensure the public
interest is being served.
To achieve these types of
interactions, it may be argued that inspectors need a
decreased emphasis on bureaucratic accountability in favor
of professional accountability controls.
It is unsurprising that inspectors complain of
bureaucratic accountability controls for several reasons.
First, performance measures – which are intertwined in
accountability conversations – of state environmental
agencies clearly emphasize output measurements
(Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003, 181-187; Gormley
2000).
Output measures related to environmental
inspectors include the number of inspections conducted, the
number of enforcement actions taken, the amounts of fines
recovered, and response rates to the regulated community
(e.g. turnaround time on report submission). By contrast,
outcome measures might include the number of tons of a
pollutant prevented from escaping into the atmosphere or
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the increase in energy efficiency from one quarter to
another. “Still most states continue to rely more on
“output” measures (such as the number of inspections
conducted) rather than “outcome” measures (such as
changes in air or water quality), despite the latter‟s greater
importance.” (Gormley and Balla 2004, 121). Part of this
reliance stems from the rigid oversight requirements state
environmental agencies face from U.S. EPA (c.f. Scheberle
2004; Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003; Lowry 1992).
“EPA has traditionally evaluated enforcement programs
primarily by measuring agency activities or outputs – what
has been referred to derisively as a “bean counting”
approach…These traditional indicies have been relied on
because they are relatively easy to measure and report …”
(Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003, 66). A focus on outputs
is vastly more common than outcome measures, such as
environmental benefits and rates of noncompliance, in state
agencies for a host of reasons (Rechtschaffen and Markell
2003; Gormley 2000). Output data is relatively easy to
tabulate and continues to be modus operandi for U.S.
EPA‟s state reporting requirements (Rechtschaffen and
Markell 2003).
In the cases of both Virginia and Ohio, a perusal of
each agency‟s website communicates an emphasis on
output data. For example, readily available on DEQ‟s
website are reports to the Virginia General Assembly. The
2009 Report on Air Quality conveys raw data about the
number of inspections completed (2,601), the number of
stack tests observed (77), and the number of enforcement
actions (483) (Virginia DEQ 2009). OEPA‟s readily
available 2009 Annual Report also presents similar
performance measurement data. After detailing the number
of hazardous waste facilities inspected (551) and the
number of citizens‟ complaints investigated (331), the
Division of Hazardous Waste issued enforcement orders
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that assed $701,575 in penalties (OEPA Annual Report
2009, 6).
Additionally, outcome data is far more difficult to
compute technically speaking and is often wrought with
debate if figures are actually calculated (Rechtschaffen and
Markell 2003, Gormley 2000). For instance, calculating
the number of tons of a pollutant that did not reach the
atmosphere is far more complex than calculating how many
times an inspector visited a particular facility. Moreover,
both states and U.S. EPA seem to resist any more than
token efforts to embrace outcome measurements
(Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003, 296-307). Continued
reliance on output measures only further entrenches an
emphasis on bureaucratic accountability from the
inspectors‟ perspective.
Second, these findings are unsurprising in light of
existing literature on front-line workers more generally and
environmental inspectors more explicitly. The motivations
for more flexibility and discretion to build relationships
may come from the inspectors‟ need to develop coping
strategies because of the “impossible” nature of their jobs
(Lipsky 1980; Fineman 1998). Front-line workers in a
variety of contexts are routinely overburdened and develop
methods of better dealing with the demands they face.
Regulators may believe that the best way to deal with
enormous facility loads is to have positive working
relationships with facility officials. Or the motivations may
stem from an earnest desire to work with the regulated
community to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes, as
the broader regulatory enforcement literature would
substantiate (c.f. Hutter 1989; Bardach and Kagan
1982/2002; Hutter 1997; May and Burby 1998, Pautz
2009). These adverse reactions to the rigidity and
complexity that inspectors face in their day-to-day
responsibilities are to be expected.
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MOVEMENT TOWARD PROFESSIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY

Although bureaucratic accountability controls are
expected in the work of environmental regulators that does
not indicate that they are the best means of ensuring
accountability. Despite the inevitable resistance likely to
accompany a shift in controls, the front-line regulators
interviewed here provide some initial support for a move
beyond bureaucratic accountability toward professional
accountability, or at the very least, some combination of
these two means of control. As previously discussed, the
regulatory literature also appears to support movement
toward professional accountability (c.f. May 2007; Sparrow
2000). The rationale for a movement toward professional
accountability and away from bureaucratic accountability is
manifold. Such a shift does not mean that abandoning
bureaucratic accountability controls is the aim; rather,
given the findings from the inspector interviews reported
here contextualized in the broader discussions of the
environmental regulatory state, movement towards
professional accountability controls might be appropriate.
First, we should listen to the front-line regulators
and their experiences on the ground to help inform
decisions about the regulatory state. As previously noted,
those individuals on the front-lines are routinely ignored
and their experiences discounted even though they are the
ones frequently in the best position to assess policy
implementation and recommend modifications (c.f.
Hummel 1991; Schmidt 1993; Pautz and Schnitzer 2008).
Specifically related to environmental policy, inspectors are
likely to have much needed assessments of the regulated
community, their intentions, their struggles, and what
changes may be needed. The inspectors interviewed here
report that they frequently feel bound to their offices and
constrained by complex regulations and burdensome

PAQ FALL 2011

389

procedures that get in the way of building relationships
with the regulated community. Numerous questions and
directions for future study – both empirical and normative –
arise. First, do we want front-line regulators in the office
ensuring environmental protection or would we rather they
be in the field working with the regulated community to
achieve environmental protection? Turnaround time on an
inspection report hardly indicates environmental protection,
yet that is one of the measures we use to assess
environmental performance and ensure accountability. It
would seem that assessing environmental protection is
more easily accomplished outside of the office; however,
paperwork, along with other reporting requirements, is a
significant portion of many environmental regulations.
Moreover, if inspectors build relationships with the
regulated community, how can we guard against regulatory
capture to ensure the public‟s interests are being served?
Although the research presented here offers no ready
answers to these important questions, thoughtful study and
discussion of these issues must occur as environmental
regulation continues to evolve.
Second, environmental policy in the U.S. is
beginning to undergo a shift away from traditional
command and control regulation, or first generation
policies21, toward more flexible and innovative next
generation policies that coincide well with professional
accountability and increased reliance on front-line
regulators (c.f. Eisner 2006; Fiorino 2006; Durant, Fiorino,
and O‟Leary 2004; Sparrow 2000; Wilbanks and Stern
2002). Throughout the history of environmental regulation
in the U.S., one particular regulatory approach has
21

The term “first-generation” environmental policies may indicate that such
policies are obsolete when that is not the intended meaning. Instead, this
common term refers to the initial, dominant approach to environmental policy
and many of its characteristics may indeed be appropriate for current
environmental policy.
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dominated the policy arena – command and control
regulation. It is this strategy that has become synonymous
with the phrase “first generation environmental policies.”
Command and control implies a top-down model that is
heavily centralized (Hoffman et. al 2002, 821; Kraft 2001,
202-203). Most of the major environmental legislation in
the U.S. is based on command and control regulation and
these statutes have resulted in dramatic improvements in
the health and overall condition of the environment (c.f.
Davies and Mazurek 1997; Andrews 1999; Kraft 2007).
Significant reductions in major air pollutants have been
realized, and many harmful pollutants have been all but
eliminated (e.g. lead, CFCs).
Because of the specificity of these regulations,
regulators are given the relatively straightforward task of
overseeing compliance with the regulations. Inspectors
have to determine if a certain emissions level is being met
or if a particular type of abatement technology is employed.
If an inspector finds a compliance problem, there are
prescribed enforcement proceedings to follow. Although
there is opportunity for some discretion on the part of an
inspector, the standards and consequences if they are not
met are defined with the aim of minimizing the opportunity
for regulatory capture. These efforts to stem the threat of
capture encourage inspectors to “go by the book” and adopt
a regulatory approach that is closer to the deterrence end of
the spectrum rather than a more accommodative approach –
at least in theory (Bardach and Kagan 1982/2002). As
King (2006) and Fiorino (2006) note, this environment
ultimately results in adversarial relations between
regulators and the regulated community.
Yet, the well-intentioned command and control
regulations and their successes are not without their
criticisms. Fiorino (2006) outlines five key limitations of
command and control regulation. First, these regulations
impede innovation because they prescribe specific
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environmental goals and processes to achieve these goals;
there is little incentive to go beyond compliance with the
regulations. Second, command and control regulations are
inflexible, legalistic, and fragmented.
Regulated
companies have few, if any, incentives to try new methods
of reducing their pollution levels because of a regulatory
system built around rules that, if violated, will send a
company to court faced with an assortment of charges and
fines. A third limitation is that command and control
regulations can be expensive. Specific technologies can be
expensive, as can adopting particular production processes
and recordkeeping.
Fourth, command and control
regulation is becoming increasingly irrelevant to many
environmental problems and is therefore ineffective. The
nature of environmental problems has changed dramatically
in the last 30 plus years. Initially, the aim was simply to
contain waste and other pollutants; now the focus is
shifting to preventing pollution before it happens (Fiorino
2006, 81).
Finally, command and control regulations are
challenging to implement – and not just for the regulated
community.
One of the underlying assumptions of
command and control regulation was that government
“knew it all” and could dictate environmental standards and
means of achieving those standards; that has proven far
from the case.
Technology changes rapidly as do
environmental challenges, and the time that it takes to pass
legislation and promulgate regulations often cannot keep up
with those changes. Such criticisms of first generation
policies are widely noted and adoption of alternative
strategies is frequently advocated (c.f. NAPA 1997; Davies
and Mazurek 1997; Rondinelli 2001; Kettl 2002a,b;
Durant, O‟Leary and Fiorino 2004; Eisner 2006; Fiorino
2006).
Next-generation environmental policy refers to
assorted policy tools that move beyond traditional
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command and control techniques. Compared to command
and control, next-generation environmental policies are
cooperative not confrontational, comprehensive rather than
fragmented, and flexible instead of rigid (Chertow and Esty
1997, 4). Since discussion of alternative policy tools is
relatively new in environmental policy literature, much of it
focuses on very specific examples of next-generation
environmental policies instead of a general examination of
these alternatives (c.f. Hockenstein, Stavins, and Whithead
1997; Stavins and Whitehead 1997; NAPA 1997; Wilbanks
and Stern 2002).
Accordingly, continued movement towards these
next-generation environmental policies will require
increased discretion and flexibility for front-line regulators,
and therefore professional accountability controls. And the
greater flexibility afforded the regulated community in how
they achieve prescribed environmental goals might
diminish the role of more traditional, bureaucratic means of
ensuring accountability, such as routine emissions
monitoring data reports.22
Undoubtedly, though,
movement towards professional accountability will face
much resistance, but that is an insufficient reason to retain
the traditional way of ensuring accountability.
CONCLUSION
While these factors may explain why bureaucratic
accountability dominates the work of environmental
inspectors, this is not an adequate explanation for the
continued pursuit of these measures, particularly when
other means of accountability might be better aligned with
22

An argument could be made that bureaucratic accountability mechanisms
need to remain in place to avoid agency capture and ensure regulators are not
co-opted by the individuals they are trying to regulate; nevertheless, the topic
leaves much room for debate (see Pautz 2010 for a more thorough discussion of
next-generation policies and the implications for inspectors).
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environmental protection objectives. Accountability is
important and appropriate mechanisms must be in place to
guard against capture and ensure service to the public, but
an overreliance on bureaucratic accountability mechanisms
can leave inspectors frustrated that protecting the health of
the environment boils down to “compliance by computer.”
Without abandoning output measures and some traditional,
bureaucratic means of ensuring accountability, professional
accountability mechanisms could be advantageous for two
reasons. First, professional accountability recognizes the
significance of inspectors and their work and acknowledges
the important role they play in protecting our environment.
Professional accountability acknowledges the expertise of
these front-line civil servants and appreciates their
contributions and the importance of their work. Second, as
we move toward next-generation environmental policies,
bureaucratic accountability is increasingly difficult with
policies that are more flexible and more reliant on
outcomes. Therefore, as the policies evolve, so must
accountability.
This exploratory research calls attention to a
neglected area of study in environmental policy literature,
regulatory literature, and accountability literature and there
is much work that remains. A more comprehensive study
of inspectors is needed, both in environmental policy and in
other regulatory contexts. Larger samples with a more
exhaustive set of questions would enable a more
comprehensive study of accountability perceptions and
preferences among regulators. Additionally, further study
is needed of the different levels of government both
domestically and internationally. Once a firmer foundation
is established through interviews, other methodologies,
such as survey research, could be employed to allow for
greater generalizability claims.
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Front-line workers – environmental inspectors in
this case – are routinely overlooked.23 Policy is made at the
highest levels and dictated to the rest of the agency. Yet,
front-line workers are responsible for the implementation
of that policy and therefore its success or failure. It is
important to recognize and appreciate their roles and
consider their views on their work to better ensure policy
implementation and outcomes.
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